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THE ALBANY SOUTH MALL CONTRACTORS
RELIEF ACT-AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
INFRINGEMENT UPON COURT OF
CLAIMS JURISDICTION
William J. Quirkf
By constitution New York provides for a court of claims to hear
and determine suits against the state.1 Section 10 of the Public Build-
ings Law, enacted in 1969,2 creates an exception to this constitutional
provision. It authorizes the General Services commissioner to deter-
mine if the state is liable to certain contractors and, if such liability
is found, to make an "equitable adjustment" in the contract price
to compensate the contractor for his damages. The General Services
commissioner's jurisdiction is limited, under section 10, to contracts
awarded in connection with the Albany South Mall project. It is esti-
mated that as a consequence of section 10 the state may pay $150
million "or more" above original contract prices to the South Mall
contractors.3 A statute as curious as section 10 merits a legislative his-
f Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. A.B. 1956, Princeton Uni-
versity; LL.B. 1959, University of Virginia.
1 The article was ratified by the people effective January 1, 1950. MANUAL FOR TH
USE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK 334 (Sec'y State ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE MANUAL]. The article provides:
The court of claims is continued. It shall consist of the eight judges now
authorized by law, but the legislature may increase such number and may re-
duce such number to six or seven. The judges shall be appointed by the gov-
ernor by and with the advice and consent of the senate and their terms of office
shall be nine years. The court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine
claims against the state or by the state against the claimant or between conflict-
ing claimants as the legislature may provide.
N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 9.
2 N.Y. PUB. BLans. LAw § 10 (McKinney Supp. 1970). See note 109 infra.
3 N.Y. Times, June 7, 1971, at 48, col. 1; id., Jan. 27, 1971, at 1, col. 3.
The Albany South Mall project was originally conceived as a means of revitalizing
the seat of state government. Id., Jan. 29, 1971, at 17, col. 1. Governor Rockefeller predicted
that the Mall "is going to turn out to be the greatest thing that has happened to this
country in 100 years." Id. The Governor reportedly first was inspired by the idea while
riding through Albany with Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands. "There's no question,"
the Governor said, "that the city did not look as I think the Princess thought it was going
to." Id., Feb. 15, 1971, at 44, col. 8.
The state comptroller estimates that the Mall will require the borrowing of one
billion dollars. Id., Feb. 8, 1971, at 22, col. 5. Over the past decade the state has adopted
an unannounced expansionary policy with respect to debt: the comptroller reports that
as of March 31, 1961, all types of state debt totaled $1.6 billion. Ten years later all types
of state debt totaled $7.1 billion, an increase of 444%. N.Y. DEP'T OF AuDrT AND CONTROL,
COMPTROLLER's SPEctAL REPORT ON THE PuBLic Dmr OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1961-71,
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tory, yet there is no record of either a governor's transmittal letter
or a governor's message upon signing the act. Secondary sources, how-
ever, give some indication of the thinking behind the statute.
The South Mall project is well behind schedule. According to an
estimate made on November 1, 1965, the project would be completed
by May 1970.4 Current official estimates schedule completion for 1975.r
Governor Rockefeller has taken the position that mud has been respon-
sible for the delay.6 According to the Governor, "a volume of mud
equal to the weight of each building" had to be removed from the
site.7 Apparently the mud problem was unexpected,8 and this initial
delay disrupted the schedule of other contractors. Numerous other
possible causes for the delay have also been mentioned.9
Section 10 of the Public Buildings Law reportedly was enacted to
"keep the contractors from quitting the project and suing the state in
the Court of Claims for damages because of the delays and their added
costs." 10 General Services Commissioner Cortland V. R. Schuyler con-
ceded that
the extra payments were being made to contractors to compensate
them for delays they encountered in their work at the site.
at 1 (1971). At the same time the tax burden has nearly tripled-from $2.052 billion in
1961 to $5.821 billion in 1970. N.Y. DEP'T OF AUDrr AND CONTROL, 1970 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE COMThOLLER 2 (1970).
4 N.Y. Times, June 7, 1971, at 48, col. 1.
5 Id.
6 Id., Jan. 29, 1971, at 17, col. 1. The mud theory may be subsidiary to the Governor's
"totalitarian society" theory. Asked why a nearby private office building had been com-
pleted in 18 months while the South Mall project had foundered, the Governor replied,
"[1]t is a perfect illustration of why private enterprise, free enterprise is better than a
totalitarian society." Id. See also 83 FORTUNE, June 1971, at 92, 94. The Mall is scheduled
to include only about 1,665,000 square feet of usable office space. One estimate puts the
cost at an average of $150 per square foot compared to an average cost in New York City
of $35. Id. at 95.
7 N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1971, at 17, col. 1.
8 This is somewhat strange since delays caused by foundation problems have been
endemic to state office building construction. E.g., Cauldwell-Wingate Co. v. State, 276 N.Y.
365, 12 N.E.2d 443 (1938) (state office building in New York City); Seglin Constr. Co. v.
State, 275 N.Y. 527, 11 N.E.2d 826 (1937) (state office building in Albany).
9 E.g., (1) inexperienced contractors (N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1971, at 17, col. 1), (2) an
undependable labor market (id., June 7, 1971, at 48, col. 1), (3) architectural design changes
(id.), (4) inadequate original plans (id.), and (5) faulty programming (id.). Some of these
causes might be considered the state's responsibility while others clearly could not.
Certainly an inexperienced contractor would have no claim against the state based on
his inexperience, nor would an undependable labor market seem to be a state responsi-
bility. The appropriate forum for sorting out these factors is the court of claims. Section
10 will not permit the court to do so.
'o N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1971, at 1, col. 8. See also id., April 14, 1971, at 31, col. 3.
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. The state... was largely responsible for the delays, which re-
sulted in inflated labor and material costs for contractors."1
The state comptroller, moreover, has been quoted as saying that the
extra payments are "predicated on the state being in default" and that
the contractors are being "compensated for any damages they may have
suffered without going to the Court of Claims.' 1 2
These accounts would lead one to believe that section 10 was in-
tended to deal with an emergency situation. The state's liability, we
are told, was dear. Nothing could prevent the contractors from aban-
doning their contracts and leaving the project in a highly incomplete
state. The contractors would then sue the state in the court of claims
where the state would be subject to awesome liability. This thesis is,
to say the least, doubtful. Initially, it should be noted that the con-
tractors could not simply abandon the project and then immediately
sue in the court of claims. The court of claims would have no juris-
diction at that time. If a contractor abandons his contract the state
must either relet the contract to a new party or itself abandon the
project.'3 In the case of the South Mall, the contracts presumably
would be relet.
The Court of Claims Act provides that a claim for breach of con-
tract "shall be filed within six months after the accrual of such claim.'
14
In Edlux Construction Corp. v. State'3 it was held that the term "claim
accrued" is not synonymous with the term "cause of action accrued."
A cause of action accrues when a contract is breached. A claim does
not accrue until the damages are ascertainable. With respect to an
abandoning contractor, damages are not ascertainable until after the
contract has been completed by the new contractor and the state has
made its "final estimate."'16 The state would not, therefore, have been
11 Id., Jan. 27, 1971, at 1, col. 3. Section 10 requires that the General Services Corn-.
missioner determine state liability before making any equitable adjustment. See text
accompanying notes 109 & 121 infra. The statement by Commissioner Schuyler seems to
indicate that he considered state liability a foregone conclusion.
12 N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1971, at 46, col. 3.
13 That is, the state is bound by the same contractual rules that bind private individ-
uals. People v. Stephens, 71 N.Y. 527 (1878). Accordingly the state may complete the
work through new contracts and recover from the abandoning contractor or its surety
the increased cost. National Sur. Corp. v. State, 169 Misc. 479, 8 N.Y.S.2d 77 (Ct. Cl. 1938).
14 N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 10(4) (McKinney 1963). Notice of intention to file a claim may
be filed within the six month period, in which case the actual claim may be filed within
two years after its accrual. Id.
15 252 App. Div. 373, 300 N.Y.S. 509 (3d Dep't 1937), aff'd, 277 N.Y. 635, 14 N.E.2d
197 (1938).
16 Id. at 374-75; 300 N.Y.S. at 512-13. See Michael V. State, 187 Misc. 342, 63 N.Y.S.2d
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subject to immediate and extensive liability to abandoning contractors.
In addition, even if the jurisdictional question could be overcome, the
court of claims would not be a desirable forum for the abandoning
South Mall contractors since (1) "legal evidence" (unnecessary under
section 10) would be required; (2) the state might be found not liable
and the contractors found liable for wrongful abandonment; (3) a
final determination of such a complicated case could easily take be-
tween five and ten years; 17 and (4) the largest reported court of claims
award in a delay case has been $574,000.28
Under authority of section 10 the General Services commissioner
has equitably adjusted two contracts. Combined, these contracts were
increased by $83,011,723, or sixty-one percent. 19 As noted, it is esti-
mated that equitable adjustments may reach $150 million or more.20
A review of the history of claims against New York State, and
particularly the movement to establish the court of claims as a con-
stitutional court,21 makes clear that section 10 is unconstitutional. 22
517 (Ct. Cl. 1946). The Michael case also involved an abandoning contractor and it was
held that no claim accrued until after completion of the contract by the new contractor.
In explaining the necessity for keeping the transaction open, the court noted:
The contractor could not know the extent of the damages it had sustained until
it was made aware of the State's measurements of the quantities of work done
and materials in place and of the State's computations of the moneys earned up to
the time of the cancellation of the contract and, in addition thereto, was informed
of the extent of its liability for the excess cost to the State arising out of the
completion contract.
Id. at 347, 63 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
17 Recently, a relatively simple delay case took almost six years from the date of
completion of the contract until determination by the court of claims. Felhaber Corp. v.
State, 63 Misc. 2d 298, 312 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
18 Id. This would come to a little over one percent of the Walsh-Corbetta equitable
adjustment. See note 19 and accompanying text infra.
19 The two contracts are (1) Felhaber-Horn foundation work, increased by 86% from
an original contract price of $37,377,000 to $68,415,723 (N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1971, at 46,
col. 3; id., April 8, 1971, at 37, col. 3) and (2) Walsh-Corbetta platform work, increased
by 537 from an original contract price of $97,777,000 to $149,750,000 (id.; id., April 14,
1971, at 31, col. 2). It is reported that Felhaber-Horn subsequently abandoned its con-
tract when refused a further equitable adjustment. Id., April 8, 1971, at 37, col. 4. The
additional cost to the state to complete the work is estimated at $3,000,000. Id. The
Walsh-Corbetta platform contract when let in 1967 was the largest in the state's history.
FORTUNE reports that Walsh-Corbetta was "the only bidder out of sixty-six contractors
directly solicited by the state. (Others complained that the state's hurry-up schedule gave
them too little time to work through the specs.)" FoTUrNE, supra note 6, at 165.
20 N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1971, at 1, col. 3; id., June 7, 1971, at 48, col. 3.
21 The idea of constitutional courts dates to the Declaration of Independence. The
Declaration recited King George's "History of repeated Injuries and Usurpations, all
having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States."
Among the "usurpations" specified was the King's use of executive courts: "He has made
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of their Offices; and the Amount
and Payment of their Salaries."
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I
HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS
Claims against the state may be divided into two types: legal and
moral. A legal claim is one which, as between ordinary citizens, would
be recognized as enforceable. A moral claim is one not recognizable
The federal Constitution sought to prevent this problem in the future by (1) vesting
the judicial power in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established
by Congress, (2) providing for judicial tenure during "good Behavior," and (3) prohibiting
any reduction of judicial salaries. U.S. CONSr. art. III, § 1. See THE FEDERAIST Nos. 78-83
(A. Hamilton). In addition, the Constitution specified the jurisdiction of the federal
courts: it provided that the "judicial Power shall extend" to nine classes of cases. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2. Congress may, pursuant to other provisions of the Constitution, create
legislative courts. Such courts may be freely abolished and are not protected by article Ill's
provisions with respect to tenure and salary. The federal Court of Claims was created
pursuant to the congressional power to pay the debts of the United States (id. art. I, § 8)
and was originally viewed as a legislative court. Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553
(1933). However, in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), the Supreme Court held
that the Court of Claims was in fact a constitutional court.
22 See notes 101-02 and accompanying text infra. The South Mall project was
conceived in illegitimacy. The project is financed with bonds issued by Albany County.
The state has entered into a lease agreement with Albany County whereby it agreed to
pay "rent" equal to the debt service on the county's bonds. In reality, of course, the bonds
are the state's. The Appellate Division has noted, "Investors in county bonds rely on the
State's credit which stands behind the rental and indemnity provisions of the South Mall
agreement." Schuyler v. South Mall Contractors, 32 App. Div. 2d 454, 457, 303 N.YS.2d
901, 904 (3d Dep't 1969). The difficulty is that the constitution provides that "no debt
shall be hereafter contracted by or in behalf of the state" unless the debt is approved
by a referendum of the people. N.Y. CONsT. art. VII, § 11. No referendum has been held
with respect to the South Mall project. The Governor and Albany County officials
reportedly agreed to evade the referendum requirement, "everybody having assumed
from the first that voters around the state would never approve a bond issue for a mall
in Albany." FoRT NE, supra note 6, at 94.
A recent report of Comptroller Arthur Levitt states that the South Mall financing
"circumvents the constitutional procedure which requires public approval of state debt
by a voter referendum." N.Y. Times, June 7, 1971, at 48, col. 2. In addition, the use of
county bonds will cost the taxpayers an additional $44.2 million in interest because the
county had a lower credit rating than the state. Id. The report further notes that
the state's role in the financing of the project has "virtually all the earmarks of debt, and
there is no question that future tax revenues are being 'mortgaged' to pay for it." Id.,
col. 2.
The comptroller's report seems at least close to the view that the state's obligations
do technically constitute debt and are therefore unconstitutional. At a minimum, the
state's chief financial officer has expressed serious constitutional doubts as to the validity
of the South Mall financing. The marketability of any additional South Mall bonds
seems questionable in light of the comptroller's view, since potential investors in South
Mall bonds do not seek a risk instrument. According to current estimates, however, the
project will require the additional issuance of about $500 million in Albany County
bonds. CoMPTRoLLER's SPEcAL REPORT ON THE PuBuc DEBT OF TnE STATE OF NEW YORK
1961-1971, supra note 3, at 9-10. Two months after, the comptroller's report the county
1971]
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between ordinary citizens but which the state may recognize when
equity and justice dictate. Legislative power with respect to both types
sold an additional $70 million of South Mall related debt. County of Albany, N.Y.,
Prospectus: $70,000,000 South Mall Construction (Serial) Bonds, Series F, Aug. 1, 1971.
Purchasers of these bonds have bought with notice of the comptroller's position and may
be in a situation different from previous buyers.
Further constitutional difficulties in connection with the South Mall financing sur-
faced in Schuyler v. South Mall Contractors, 32 App. Div. 2d 454, 303 N.Y.S.2d 901 (3d
Dep't 1969). In 1969 the legislature inserted a provision into the deficiency budget (Act
of Jan. 8, 1969, ch. 1, [1969] N.Y. Laws 30), authorizing the General Services Commissioner
to negotiate a contract for the construction of a library and museum as part of the South
Mall project. Schuyler tested the 1969 law against two venerable constitutional prohibi-
tions.
Since 1894 the constitution has prohibited the inclusion of any provision in a budget
or deficiency budget "unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation in
the bill." N.Y. CoNsr. art. VII, § 6. This constitutional provision was intended to prevent
the inclusion of general legislation in an appropriation bill. As Daniel H. McMillan told
the 1894 convention, "The object ... is to prevent many abuses which have obtained in the
Legislature, of tacking on to the annual appropriation and supply bill various provisions
which otherwise could not be enacted." II REvIsED RECORD OF THE CoNsrrrTToNAr CON-
VENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1894, at 599 (1900). The Schuyler court held that the
constitutional prohibition was not violated by the South Mall library and museum provi-
sion, reasoning that the deficiency budget did appropriate $136 million for the construction
of state buildings including the building in question. 32 App. Div. 2d at 456, 303 N.Y.S.2d
at 903.
The second constitutional provision discussed in Schuyler was article III, section 15.
This section, added to the constitution in 1846, provides that no "private or local bill,
which may be passed by the legislature, shall embrace more than one subject, and that
shall be expressed in the title." The purpose of section 15 has been described by the
Court of Appeals as "twofold":
First, to prevent a combination of measures in local bills, and secure their passage
by a union of interests commonly known as "log-rolling." Second, to require an
announcement of the subject of every such bill, to prevent the fraudulent
insertion of provisions upon subjects foreign to that indicated in the title. It was
intended that every local subject should stand upon its own merits, and that the
title of each bill should indicate the subject of its provisions, so that neither
legislators nor the public would be misled or deceived.
Rochester v. Briggs, 50 N.Y. 553, 558 (1872). If the library and museum provision were
considered a "local bill" it would necessarily fall since it was not referred to in the title
of the deficiency budget. If the provision related to a county project it would clearly be
"local." Schuyler held that the South Mall project was not local since the county had no real
interest or involvement. It was a state project and the investors in county bonds "rely
on the State's credit." 32 App. Div. 2d at 457, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 904. The court therefore
found Albany County's role in the South Mall to be purely formalistic: the project is in
reality of a "distincly State character." Id. at 457, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
The Schuyler court's conclusion creates two deep problems for the Mall financing.
First, the state's lease is invalid because the state has in reality contracted a debt and
no referendum has been held. Second, the county bonds are invalid because the constitu-
tion prohibits a county from contracting debt for a state project. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 2. The Albany County bond issue for the Mall was statutorily authorized in 1964. N.Y.
COUNTY LAW § 850(l)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1970). The draftsmen of the legislation were
aware of the constitutional problem and went to some lengths to establish that a county
purpose would be served by the Mall. The legislation begins with a section entitled "legisla-
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of claims has always been, and continues to be, extensive. Currently,
the only significant constitutional restraint upon the legislative power
is procedural: since 1950, when the court of claims became a constitu-
tional court, the constitution has required that all claims against the
state, whether legal or moral, be presented in that tribunal.28
Restrictions on legislative power with respect to claims against
the state may be roughly divided into three historical periods: (1) the
early period (1777-1874) during which the legislature, with nearly un-
limited power, was able to audit and allow any legal or moral claim;
(2) the middle period (1874-1949) during which certain substantive
limitations2 4 as well as minor procedural limitations25 were imposed;
and (3) the current period (1950- ) during which the substantive
limitations have been largely deleted 26 but procedural limitations have
been strengthened. The constitution now requires that all claims
against the state be heard and determined by the court of claims.2 7
A court of claims judge is appointed by the governor with the
advice and consent of the senate, for a term of nine years.28 He is
tive findings and declaration" which endeavors to establish a county purpose. This section
recites that "the process of construction may itself provide a valuable stimulus to the local
economy"; "local real property values and revenues to the county government are cor-
respondingly increased"; "state office building projects are thus an important stabilizing
and growth factor in the economic vitality of the county in which they are located"; and
"it can serve to revitalize the entire area by clearing deteriorated commercial structures
and substandard ...housing conditions." Act of March 23, 1964, ch. 152, § 1, [1964]
N.Y. Laws 186. Following these and other "legislative findings and determinations," the
section concludes that the above purposes "are hereby found and declared to be county
purposes." Id. It is hardly credible to argue that such incidental benefits constitute a
county purpose sufficient to justify a billion dollars of county debt. In addition, it would
seem that the court in Schuyler has already repudiated these legislative findings. It is
clearly inconsistent to say that the same project constitutes a county purpose for purposes
of article VIII and a "distinctly State" project for purposes of article III.
23 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
24 E.g., extra compensation to contractors was prohibited. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 24
(1874).
25 E.g., the legislature could not itself audit or allow a claim, but rather was required
to refer it to an "appropriate tribunal." People ex rel. Swift v. Luce, 204 N.Y. 478, 97
N.E. 850 (1912); Cole v. State, 102 N.Y. 48, 6 N.E. 277 (1886). However, the legislature
had full power over the jurisdiction and personnel of the "appropriate tribunal." People
ex rel. Swift v. Luce, supra at 486, 97 N.E. at 852-53. The legislature could, and did,
abolish existing tribunals and create new ones more agreeable to it. See notes 51-54 and
accompanying text infra.
26 Extra compensation to contractors is no longer expressly prohibited.
27 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 9. For discussions of the court of claims, see E. BRtEUE, THE
NEw YoRK STATE COURT OF CLAms: ITS HISTORY, JURIsDICTION AND REPoRTs (1959); J.
DAvISON, CLAIMs AGAINST THE STATE OF NEw YoRu (1954); Glavin, The Court of Claims-
Its History, Jurisdiction and Practice, 21 N.Y.S.B.A. BULL. 257 (1949).
28 N.Y. CONsr. art. VI, § 9.
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subject to the same qualifications and restrictions as supreme court
justices.29 His compensation "shall not be diminished during the term
of office." 80 A court of claims judge, except in cases of disability, may
be removed only "for cause" and after due notice and a hearing.3 1
The contemporary judiciary article gives some indication of the
underlying philosophy of the current period: substantive limitations
on claims are not essential if a constitutional court, independent of
the legislature and executive, is required to hear and determine all
claims.
Reform movements directed at establishing the court of claims
as an independent constitutional court date back to the proposed con-
stitution of 1867.82 The abuses of the early period (1777-1874) had
by that time become apparent. Legal claims had been determined and
audited by the legislature as it saw fit and legislative discretion was
unreviewable. In addition, the legislative jurisdiction had been judi-
cially expanded to include non-legal or moral claims. In Town of
Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango County, 3 the Court of Appeals
held that taxes might be imposed to pay a private claim that was le-
gally unenforceable. Further, it found that the courts "have no power
to supervise or review" the legislative action.3 4 The court relied upon
Guilford four years later when it held that the legislature could compel
29 Id. § 20.
30 Id. § 25.
31 Id. §§ 22, 23. Section 22 permits removal for cause after notice and a hearing
by the court on the judiciary. The court on the judiciary is composed of the Chief Judge
and senior associate judge of the Court of Appeals and one appellate division justice
from each judicial department. Section 23 permits removal for cause on the recommenda-
tion of the governor if two-thirds of the senate concurs. The judge must be served with
a statement of the cause alleged and must be given an opportunity to be heard.
32 The federal Court of Claims had been created in 1855. Prior to that date claims
against the federal government had been determined by Congress itself. See, e.g., Ex
parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929), in which the Court stated:
For sixty-five years following the adoption of the Constitution Congress
made it a practice not only to determine various claims itself but also to commit
the determination of many to the executive departments. In time, as claims
multiplied, that practice subjected Congress and those departments to a heavy
burden. To lessen that burden Congress created the Court of Claims and dele-
gated to it the examination and determination of all claims within stated classes.
Id. at 452 (footnote omitted).
33 13 N.Y. 143 (1855).
34 Id. at 148 (Denio, J.). Judge Denio found that the legislature could appropriate
public monies to meet both legal claims and those "founded in equity and justice." Id. at
149. Since its determination of "equity and justice" was nonreviewable, the legislative power
was complete, with one exception: since all state action must conform to the state's funda-
mental law, the legislature could not recognize a claim in violation of "express constitu-
tional restrictions." Id.
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the city of Syracuse to pay extra compensation to a sewer contractor.85
Thereafter, the legislative award of extra compensation to specific
contractors became a notorious practice. The 1867 convention, in its
address to the people, specified its efforts to remedy this practice:
We have created a court of claims for the adjudication of all
demands against the State, and taken away the power of the Legis-
lature to pass laws in relation to claims, thereby removing one
prolific cause of frequent, interested, and sometimes improvident
legislation .... 36
35 Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N.Y. 116 (1859). In 1876, however, the court modified
Guilford to hold that the legislative power to spend funds was not unrestrained: expendi-
ture must be for a "public purpose," which is a judicially reviewable standard, although
the "answer is not always ready, nor easily to be found." Weismer v. Village of Douglas,
64 N.Y. 91, 99 (1876). Following this decision, the courts were at least back in the picture,
but the vague standards involved, "public purpose" and "equity and justice," led to
peculiar results. For example, a claim of war veterans was found to lack "equity and
justice" (People v. Westchester County Natl Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 182 N.E. 241 (1921)) while
the claim of bondholders-whose bonds contained a disclaimer of state liability-was held
to possess "equity and justice" (Williamsburgh Say. Bank v. State, 243 N.Y. 231, 153 NX.
58 (1926)).
Guilford itself had qualified the legislative power by ruling that the legislature could
not recognize a claim whose payment would violate an express constitutional provision.
Note 34 supra. This principle was breached in Williamsburgh when the Court held the
state liable on bonds which had been issued by the Canaseraga Creek Improvement
District without a referendum. The 1938 constitutional convention debated the Williams-
burgh case and determined to bar any future implied state liability on debt not issued in
accordance with the constitution. HI REvisED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK, 1938, at 2258-91 (1938) [hereinafter cited as REcoRa--1938].
Liability was to be prohibited whether payment was sought under the guise of a moral
claim or otherwise. Since 1938, the constitution has provided:
Neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall at any time be
liable for the payment of any obligations issued by such a public corporation
heretofore or hereafter created, nor may the legislature accept, authorize ac-
ceptance of or impose such liability upon the state or any political subdivision
thereof ....
N.Y. CoNsT. art. X, § 5. The law of moral obligation is discussed in Quirk & Wein, A
Short Constitutional History of Entities Commonly Known as Authorities, 56 CORNL.L L.
REv. 521, 552-61 (1971).
36 Address of the Convention to the People of the State, in V DocuMr rs oiF THE
CONVENTION OF THE STATE Or Nav YORK, 1867-68, No. 184, at 2-3 (1868). The text of the
court of claims provision read as follows:
There shall be a Court of Claims, composed of three Judges appointed by the
Governor with the consent of the Senate, in which shall be adjudicated such
claims against the State as the Legislature shall by general law direct.
Id., No. 185, at 19. The provision is essentially similar to the current constitutional pro-
vision ratified by popular vote in 1949. The last phrase of the 1867 language reads, "as the
Legislature shall by general law direct," While the current language reads, "as the
legislature may provide." N.Y. CONSr. art. VI, § 9. In both cases the purpose seems the
same: to retain legislative power over the classes of claims which may be heard by
the court. However, the extent of the retained power may be different. The history
of the 1867 provision makes clear that the legislature was to retain the power to expand
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The proposed constitution, with the exception of the judiciary article
(which did not contain the court of claims provision), was defeated by
popular referendum.37
Following the defeat of the 1867 constitution, the legislature re-
turned to its practice of granting special awards of extra compensation
to contractors. In 1872, Governor John T. Hoffman called for the
creation of a constitutional commission, noting that legislative awards
of extra compensation had tended "greatly to encumber the statute
book, demoralize the Legislature, and deplete the treasury."38 The
constitutional commission of 1872 considered, but did not recommend,
the creation of a constitutional court of claims.3 9 Generally, the 1872
commission's approach was less radical than that of the 1867 conven-
tion. For example, the 1867 constitution would have prohibited the
legislature from passing any special law with respect to a claim.40
Claims against the state would have been authorized only by general
laws, applicable equally to all persons in a given class.4 1 All claims
would therefore have been legal ones and the special recognition of
moral claims would have been eliminated.
The 1872 constitutional commission was not prepared to go that
far. It sought only to end the worst substantive abuses and to establish
a procedural safeguard. The 1874 constitutional amendments, based
on the work of the 1872 constitutional commission, absolutely pro-
hibited the legislature from passing any law (1) awarding extra com-
pensation to contractors 42 or (2) reviving any claim barred by the statute
of limitations. 43 Procedurally, the 1874 amendments prohibited the
or contract the classes of claims which might be heard. Thomas G. Alvord explained to
the convention that the waiver of sovereign immunity was experimental and that it
should be left "in the hands of the Legislature to say how far individuals shall be per-
mitted to go before the court, and how far the sovereignty of the State shall remain in
abeyance, in the decision of claims against the State." V PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK HELD IN 1867 AND 1868, at
8647 (E. Underhill ed. 1868). In 1949 the waiver of sovereign immunity was no longer
experimental. It may be that the 1949 amendment incorporated into the constitution
the existing statutory jurisdiction of the court of claims. It would then follow that the
only currently retained legislative power is to add classes of claims to the court's juris-
diction. See note 102 infra.
37 The vote was 223,935 for and 290,456 against. LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 316.
38 VI MESSAGES FRoM THE GovERNOaS 402-03 (C. Lincoln ed. 1909).
S9 JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK 49, 68,
125, 173-75, 191 (1873).
40 V DocUMENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF TH STATE OF NEw YORK, 1867-68, No. 185,
at 12 (1868).
41 Id.
42 N.Y. CONST. art. IM, § 3 (1874).
43 Id. art. VII, § 14.
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legislature from itself auditing or allowing any private claim against
the state.44 Instead, the legislature was only permitted to "appropriate
money to pay such claims as shall have been audited and allowed
according to law."45 The Court of Appeals described the situation
created by the 1874 amendments as follows:
The Constitution prohibits the legislature from exercising the
power of itself auditing claims, which is in its nature judicial, but
provides for the payment of claims which shall have been audited
or allowed according to law; thus recognizing the power of the legis-
lature to provide by law for the auditing and allowing by some
appropriate tribunal of claims against the State.41
Prior to 1874 the legislature, as a matter of convenience, had
created statutory tribunals to hear certain canal claims.47 After 1874,
the creation of a statutory tribunal was mandatory rather than a matter
of convenience if private claims were to be allowed. But the legislature
had full control over the form, jurisdiction, and personnel of the tri-
bunal.48 In Cole v. State49 it was held that the legislature had the power
to refer a moral claim, as well as a legal one, to any "proper tribunal."5' 0
Free exercise of the legislative power to create "proper" tribunals
was the dominant characteristic of the middle period (1874-1949). The
following entities, with roughly the same jurisdiction, were consecu-
tively created during this period to hear private claims: (1) board of
44 Id. art. III, § 19.
45 Id.
46 Cole v. State, 102 N.Y. 48, 52, 6 N.E. 277, 278 (1886) (emphasis in original). In
People ex rel. Swift v. Luce, 204 N.Y. 478, 97 N.E. 850 (1912), Chief Judge Cullen spoke in
a similar vein:
Thereupon [following the ratification of article III, section 19 in 1874] it became
necessary, unless the state was either to violate its obligations or was willing to
surrender its immunity and subject itself to suits in the courts like other litigants,
for the legislature to create some board or tribunal which could pass upon and
audit claims against it.
Id. at 484.
47 Act of April 21, 1870, ch. 321, [1870] N.Y. Laws 749 (board of canal appraisers);
Act of April 20, 1825, ch. 275, [1825] N.Y. Laws 398 (canal appraisers); Act of April 3,
1821, ch. 240, [1821] N.Y. Laws 248 (canal appraisers); Act of April 15, 1817, ch. 262,
[1817] N.Y. Laws 801 (canal commissioners). During this period the great bulk of claims
against the state arose from the ownership and operation of the canal system.
48 This would not, of course, be true if the legislature simply waived sovereign im-
munity thereby vesting jurisdiction in the supreme court. In New York, however, the
state's waiver has always been limited to a special court or tribunal.
49 102 N.Y. 48, 6 N.E. 277 (1886).
50 Id. at 53, 6 N.E. at 278. The only limitation on the legislative power was the
constitution: where "the creation of a particular class of liabilities is prohibited by
the Constitution, it would of course be an infraction of that instrument to pass any law
authorizing their enforcement. ... Id. at 54, 6 N.E. at 279.
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audit,51 (2) board of claims,52 (3) court of claims,53 (4) board of claims,54
and (5) court of claims. 55
These tribunals derived their authority entirely from the legisla-
ture. The legislature could not audit or allow a claim,56 but it could
51 Act of June 2, 1876, ch. 444, [1876] N.Y. Laws 477.
52 Act of April 7, 1883, ch. 205, [1883] N.Y. Laws 211.
53 Act of March 9, 1897, ch. 36, [1897] N.Y. Laws 14.
54 Act of July 29, 1911, ch. 856, [1911] N.Y. Laws 2396.
55 Act of March 19, 1915, ch. 100, [1915] N.Y. Laws 316; Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 1,
[1915] N.Y. Laws 1.
56 The current constitution provides that no "money shall ever be paid out of the
state treasury... except in pursuance of an appropriation by law." N.Y. CONSr. art. VII,
§ 7. The constitution further provides that the payment of state money, "except upon
audit by the comptroller, shall be void." Id. art. V, § 1. The comptroller, therefore, is
vested with all those powers incidental to, or inherent in, the conduct of an audit. At
one point, the Court of Appeals viewed the comptroller's auditing power as involving
a "judicial function." People ex rel. Grannis v. Roberts, 163 N.Y. 70, 57 N.E. 98 (1900).
In that case the comptroller refused payment to a contractor on the grounds that the
contract price was excessive and that payment would be a "waste of the funds of the
state." The contractor brought a mandamus to require the comptroller to pay, but
the court held that mandamus would not lie against the comptroller since his function
was discretionary:
The auditing of an account by the comptroller involves a judicial function. He
is required in the language of the books "to hear, to examine, to pass upon,
to settle and adjust." That function he cannot be required to exercise in any
particular way by mandamus ....
Id. at 78, 57 N.E. at 101.
For practical purposes then, following Grannis the comptroller's determination
was final with respect to matters within his jurisdiction. The relationship of his juris-
diction to that of the statutory court of claims was involved in Quayle v. State, 192 N.Y.
47, 84 N.E. 583 (1908). There, a printer claimed that the state owed him money for work
performed under his contract. The jurisdiction of the court of claims was not exclusive;
by statute it had been provided that the court not hear a claim if it was submitted by
law to any other tribunal or officer for audit or determination. The printer filed his
claim with the court of claims which dismissed it. The Court of Appeals believed the
issue to be whether the court of claims had any jurisdiction to hear the claim. The court,
by Chief Judge Cullen, held that it did not: "We hold that claims for such current
expenses of the state government as are provided for by those statutes [appropriations]
must be presented to the comptroller for audit." Id. at 53, 84 N.E. at 585. Cullen observed
that the proper jurisdiction of the court of claims was "those claims which lay beyond
the auditing power of the comptroller" and which, prior to the constitutional amendment,
had been determined by the legislature itself. The court noted that notwithstanding the
1874 amendment prohibiting the legislature from auditing or allowing a claim,
the power of the comptroller to audit claims for the payment of which there
had been appropriations remained unaffected. It is difficult to believe that the
legislature in creating the Board of Audit or of Claims intended to leave it
optional with any claimant to apply either to the comptroller or to the board for
an audit of his claim, or to allow an appeal from the comptroller to the board.
Id. at 53, 84 N.E. at 585. The court expressly reserved the question whether the court
of claims would have jurisdiction if the comptroller refused audit because an appropri-
ation was exhausted.
Quayle represents the high point of the comptroller's power. It held that he had
jurisdiction over claims "for such current expenses" as are provided for in appropriation
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freely abolish an old forum and create a new one, and its motivation
for doing so could not be judicially reviewed. People ex rel. Swift V.
Luce,57 which involved the validity of the creation of the board of
claims in 1911, removed any question as to the extent of legislative
power. The 1911 legislation had effected the removal of judges ap-
pointed to the court of claims under an 1897 act. The removed judges
asserted that they were "judicial officers" and, according to the con-
stitution, could be removed only by a two-thirds vote of the senate. 8
They argued, in addition, that the constitution required that such
removal be "for cause" following notice and an opportunity to be
heard.59 The judges' contention that they were judicial officers en-
titled to constitutional protection rested on the premise that the 1897
court of claims was a court within the meaning of the constitution.
The Court of Appeals held that it was not. In an opinion by
Chief Judge Cullen, the court first noted that the legislature had no
power to create a new court with statewide jurisdiction. Cullen based
this principle upon an 1857 case, Sill v. Village of Corning.60 Sill in-
volved the constitutionality of the legislative creation of a local village
court with limited civil jurisdiction. Since the judiciary article of the
1846 constitution expressly required the creation of a series of courts
ranging from courts of impeachment to the courts of justices of the
peace, it was argued that the constitutional design was complete; there-
fore the legislature could create no other courts. Chief Judge Denio
disagreed, noting that he saw no constitutional prohibition against
the creation of a village court.6' He made clear, however, that the
legislature had no power with respect to the "higher courts, whose
jurisdiction pervades the whole state."6 12 The legislature could not
create courts and confer upon them the jurisdiction constitutionally
granted to the state supreme court or Court of Appeals.63
acts. Id. at 53, 84 N.E. at 585. Grannis had already held that his determination was
effectively nonreviewable. This situation was drastically altered by a statutory change
made shortly thereafter. In 1908 the jurisdiction of the court of claims was expanded to
include claims which had been rejected by the comptroller. Act of June 16, 1908, ch.
519, [1908] N.Y. Laws 1894. Subsequently, the comptroller's audit was a necessary, but
preliminary, step.
57 204 N.Y. 478, 97 N.E. 850 (1912).
58 N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 11 (1894).
59 Id.
60 15 N.Y. 297 (1857).
61 Chief Judge Denio contrasted language in the 1846 constitution dealing with the
judicial and legislative power. Article III, section 1, had provided that the "legislative
power of this State shall be vested in the Senate and Assembly." Article VI contained no
similar language vesting the state's judicial authority in the courts. 15 N.Y. at 800.
62 Id. at 299.
63 The Chief Judge observed:
I am of the opinion that the [constitutional] provision respecting the higher
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Sill arose under the 1846 constitution; the court in Swift thought
it "even more plain under the Constitution of 1894 that the higher
courts there enumerated are intended to be exclusive." 64 In Swift it
was argued that the foregoing principles, although true, were inappli-
cable and that there could be no question of depriving the supreme
court of its constitutional jurisdiction since it had no jurisdiction over
claims against the state. The court rejected this argument noting that
the supreme court
had not jurisdiction solely because of the immunity of the defen-
dant .... not because it did not have jurisdiction of such a cause
of action .... If a claim is made litigable at all, that is to say, if
made the subject of a suit or litigation in a court of law, then under
the express provision of the Constitution the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court attaches at once.65
The court concluded that the legislature had no power to create the
court of claims as a court within the meaning of the constitution. The
incumbent judges were therefore not "judicial officers" and could be
freely removed.
In Swift the court noted that an effort had been made at the 1894
constitutional convention to establish the court of claims as a constitu-
tional court.66 That effort was renewed at the 1915 convention. By
1915 the political football tendencies of a nonconstitutional forum
were evident. In 1897 the board of claims had been abolished and the
court of claims created; in 1911 the court of claims had been abol-
courts, whose jurisdiction pervades the whole state, is exclusive in its character,
and that no other courts of the same jurisdiction can be added by the legislature.
Thus, there can be no Court of Impeachments, nor any Court of Appeals, or
Supreme Court, nor I think, any county courts, except those which the constitu-
tion has made provision for; and it would be an evasion of the clear constitutional
implication to create courts of the same general character and jurisdiction, though
differing in some particulars.
Id. at 299-500. The Chief Judge believed the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts to
be exclusive although the constitution did not expressly so provide. He noted:
It is by the application of reasonable principles of construction that we are able
to say that no tribunals fulfilling the general purposes of the constitutional courts,
expressly provided for, can be erected. The maxim, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, applies directly to this case in that aspect ....
Id. at 300. Similarly, it cannot be maintained that the legislature has power to turn the
General Services commissioner into a court and confer upon him, or it, the jurisdiction
of the constitutional court of claims.
64 People ex rel. Swift v. Luce, 204 N.Y. 478, 487, 97 N.E. 850, 851 (1912).
65 Id. at 487-88, 97 N.E. at 851.
66 Charles Z. Lincoln, the constitutional historian and a delegate to the 1894 con-
vention, offered an amendment to establish a constitutional court of claims. I REvIsED
REcoRD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEWv YoRK, 1894, at 426
(1900). The amendment was referred to the judiciary committee which failed to report it
out. V id. at 1070.
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ished and the board of claims reestablished; in 1915 the board of
claims had been abolished and the court of claims reestablished. In
no case did a desire for substantive change play a role; rather, there
was only a desire to change personnel. The changes created a few jobs
for the party in power and provided a forum apt to be favorably
disposed to the party's contributors. Swift, decided in 1912, ruled that
such changes were within the power of the legislature.
The judiciary committee of the 1915 constitutional convention,
chaired by General George W. Wickersham, proposed a judiciary arti-
cle which included the creation of a constitutional court of claims. In
neither the committee nor the convention did many doubt the neces-
sity of a constitutional court. However, there was some debate as to
the form it should take. The committee reported:
To end the recurrent scandals resulting from the Legislature
dealing with the Court of Claims as a mere political football, your
Committee has provided for the continuance of this court as a
constitutional court. Two courses only appear to be open in deal-
ing with this matter.67
The two courses open were (1) to transfer to the supreme court the
jurisdiction of the existing court of claims, or (2) to leave the jurisdic-
tion in a specialized court of claims but to make that court a constitu-
tional one. The committee favored a specialized court to handle claims
against the state, observing that its jurisdiction "is essentially different
from that of ordinary courts of justice" 68 and should be exercised "in a
simple summary manner, without being hampered by technical rules
of law."6 9
When the measure reached the convention floor a substantial
number of delegates took the position that the jurisdiction should be
transferred to the supreme court. These delegates cited the following
advantages: (1) uniformity of judicial system; 70 (2) convenience of liti-
gants; 71 (3) more objective treatment;7 2 and (4) the idea that the full
waiver of sovereign immunity7 3 should include elimination of the
67 Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, in DocumENTs or THE CONSTrITTONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1915, No. 42, at 13-14 (1915). See also III RECORD
(UNREVISED) OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK, 1915, at
2363 (1915) (statement of General Wickersham) [hereinafter cited as REcop-1915].
68 Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 67, at 14.
69 Id.
70 III REcoRan-1915, at 2465.
71 Id. at 2465, 2480-81.
72 Several delegates viewed the existing court of claims as biased in the state's
favor. E.g., id. at 2472-76 (remarks of Mr. Ostrander); id. at 2478-82 (remarks of Mr.
Brackett).
73 N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 8 (McKinney 1963).
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state's special forum.74 The delegates favoring a constitutional court
of claims emphasized that the supreme court would be more sus-
ceptible to local influence. Judge Clearwater commented that in the
supreme court "every claimant would have... local influence which [is]
his standing in the community, his influence, the various tentacula
which important men have and can extend... ."7 The Wickersham
committee had originally favored transferring jurisdiction to the su-
preme court,76 but was persuaded by the testimony of judges and state
officials that "in the interest of the State and in the protection of the
treasury of the State, it was essential to preserve the Court of Claims
....",77 Future Governor Alfred E. Smith agreed with the committee
that the special court should be the exclusive forum for claims against
the state. Smith observed:
Having no interest whatever in any claims against the State, and
having considerably less in their attorneys, but having some interest
in the State, and considerable interest in the taxpayers, I respect-
fully submit to the Convention that if we are going to continue to
allow the State to be sued, let it all be done in one place, so that
we can keep our eye on it. (Laughter.)78
The convention adopted the committee approach. 79
With the defeat" of the 1915 constitution and its judiciary article,
however, the need for judicial reform became more pressing.81 The
legislature therefore created the judiciary constitutional convention of
1921 to consider amendments to the judiciary article.82 Composed of
74 11I R.Econ--1915, at 2465.
75 Id. at 2459.
78 Id. at 2483.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 2472.
79 Id. at 2487. The text of the provision appears at IV id. at 4334-85.
80 LGisLATIV MANUAL 822. Former Governor Smith, at the 1938 convention, attrib-
uted the defeat of the 1915 constitution to a comment by retired Court of Appeals Judge
Cullen. Smith reported that Judge Cullen lived in Brooklyn Heights and used to go
walking on Sunday mornings. Smith continued:
A number of reporters came up to talk to the old Judge and one of them said,
"Judge, what do you think about the proposed new Constitution?" And his re-
ply to the reporters was, "No drunhead courts in times of peace."
Now, nobody knew what that meant. I surely did not, and I do not think
I ever met anybody who knew what the Judge meant by that, but there was not
a single thing said against the Constitution of 1915 that went so far to defeat it
by the million votes than that statement by the old Judge...
II Racom--1938, at 938.
81 IX N.Y. SrATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTON COMM., PROBLEMS RELATING TO JUDr.
CIAL ADMINRATION AND ORGANIZATION 428 (1938) [hereinafter cited as JuDIaEAL ADMINs-
TRATION].
82 Act of April 30, 1921, ch. 348, [1921] N.Y. Laws 1129. The legislature could not
create a "constitutional convention" as that term is used in the constitution. The consti-
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thirty appointed members, the judiciary convention met in May 1921
in Albany and elected Judge Pound of the Court of Appeals as its
permanent chairman.83 The convention also appointed an executive
committee, of which Judge Pound was a member, and a number of
subcommittees, all of which were authorized to hold public hearings.
The resulting report of the executive committee recommended the
creation of a constitutional court of claims, stating:
The Court of Claims is made a constitutional court in order to
put to an end the practice of making it a football of politics, as has
been the case three times in eight years. The practice has developed
of reconstituting the court upon every change of political control
under mere changes of nomenclature from the Court of Claims to
the Board of Claims, and vice versa.
... Private claims have been a fruitful source of special legis-
lation and of possible legislative corruption.
[T]he practice of passing special acts giving the board jurisdic-
tion to hear and decide special private claims continued and
indeed is still a source of objectionable legislation.8 4
The executive committee also considered and rejected the idea of
transferring the jurisdiction to the supreme court.85
The judiciary convention adopted all executive committee rec-
ommendations except the court of claims proposal. The proposal was
defeated despite almost universal agreement that some kind of consti-
tutional forum should be provided for claims against the state. 6 The
committee proposal foundered on the continuing dispute as to whether
jurisdiction should be transferred to the supreme court or retained in
a special, but constitutional, court of claims.
The 1921 debate was reminiscent of the 1915 constitutional con-
vention. William D. Guthrie of New York City, chairman of the exec-
tution requires both submission to the people of the question whether a convention shall
be held and election by the people of the delegates. Nevertheless, the status of the judi-
ciary convention of 1921 was identical to that of the constitutional commission of 1872.
Both could only recommend amendments to the legislature. If two successive legislatures
agreed on the amendment it could be submitted to popular referendum.
83 JUDIcrAL ADMIISTRATION 430.
84 Id. at 445-47.
85 Id. at 449.
86 Only Judge Pound questioned this idea; he saw no particular distinction between
the statutory court of claims and other legislative boards such as the Public Service Com-
mission. Id. at 540. Judge Pound also gave an interesting account of the court of claims
legislation. He noted that the 1897 act that first created the court of claims was enacted
"to gratify, as I understand, the pride of a gentleman who had held high executive office,
but who desired to be an appointee on the Board of Claims ... ." Id.
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utive committee, explained the committee's position8s After some
debate, a vote was taken on the question, should claims be heard in
the supreme court? This received a favorable majority of delegates in
attendance, but failed to achieve the necessary sixteen votes.88 Then
a vote was taken on the committee proposition, should there be a con-
stitutional court of claims? The vote was thirteen in favor and five
opposed 8 9 The motion therefore lost and no reference to the court of
claims was contained in the convention's proposed amendments.
Oddly, the convention's failure to make any reference to the court
of claims created a problem. The convention's supplemental report
87 Id. at 531. Guthrie also discussed problems such as whether the judges should be
appointed or elected. The advantage of requiring election was that "there ought to be a
separation of the judges from the executive." Id. The disadvantage was that because of
the expense and effort involved it would be difficult to get "first-class men" to run unless
the term of office were increased from six to 14 years. Id. The committee therefore recom-
mended a compromise proposal providing for the appointment of the three judges, but
also for a system of staggered terms so that the governor, during a single term, could
appoint only one judge. Id. at 532.
In contrast to the 1915 constitution which had provided that the existing judges of
the statutory court of claims would serve until the expiration of their terms, the committee
proposal eliminated the incumbents and gave the governor power, with the advice and
consent of the senate, to appoint new judges. Id. at 532-33, 536.
Following Guthrie's explanation of the executive committee's position, three delegates
spoke in favor of a transfer of the claims jurisdiction to the supreme court. Mr. Borst
said that "the State should submit itself to the jurisdiction of its own court." Id. at 537.
Mr. Newburger noted that he was unimpressed with the argument that the claims cases
required the expertise of a specialized court. The first department, he pointed out,
handled many contractors' claims against the city with no particular difficulty. Id. at 537-
38. Mr. Benedict favored transfer to the supreme court but offered a rather reasonable
compromise: if it was believed that a specialized and centralized court was needed, such
a court could be established as a special branch or division of the supreme court. Id. at
543. These three men had the power, by themselves, to defeat the committee proposal.
See note 88 infra. Arthur Sutherland of Rochester urged the convention not to be dis-
tracted by the subsidiary question of where the jurisdiction should go. The point was
rather whom it should be taken from; the legislature had abused its power and its con-
trol over the jurisdiction should be ended. JUDIcIAL ADMNISTATION 544. "[L]et us not
forget," Sutherland warned, "that to leave the matter as it is in the hands of the Legisla-
ture, is going to invite a continuance of these scandals which ought not to be continued."
Id.
88 A peculiarity of the convention was that it required almost unanimous assent to
adopt a provision. The statute creating the convention provided that it was to be com-
posed of 30 members and that a majority (16) of favorable votes was necessary to adopt
a provision. However, the convention was sparsely attended and no more than 18 mem-
bers ever appeared at the critical meetings. At times, only 16 members were present and
unanimous consent was necessary. Id. at 471, 476, 494. Consequently, any proposal before
the convention could be defeated by a maximum of three votes. In fact, the committee
proposal on the court of claims was defeated although it received a favorable vote of 13
to five. Id. at 550.
89 Id.
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recited that publication of its initial report had caused considerable
discussion among members of the bar. 0 As a result, the executive
committee had reopened hearings and received testimony from a num-
ber of groups which had been silent during the original 1921 hearings.
Based on these new hearings the executive committee recommended
to the legislature a number of changes in the proposed judiciary
amendment. One change involved the court of claims. The supple-
mental report stated:
Finally, it was urged that the failure to refer in the Judiciary
Article in any way to the Court of Claims or to the power of the
Legislature to create, continue, or abolish any such tribunal of
State-wide jurisdiction to hear, audit and determine claims against
the State might be construed as impairing the legislative power in
that respect. In order to prevent any such construction of the Ju-
diciary Article ... it is recommended that a new section be added
.... 91
A section expressly preserving the power of the legislature to create or
abolish the court of claims therefore became part of the constitution
in January 1925.92
It is difficult to understand the reasoning behind the executive
committee's recommendation. Constitutional silence would not seem
to impair any existing legislative power. Further, the debates and ac-
tion of the convention had made clear that no change was intended. At
best the new section seemed premised on an excess of caution. None-
theless, the provision possessed considerable importance as a constitu-
tional declaration of existing law, its only intent being to preserve the
status quo. It therefore codified Swift and provided an interpretation
of section 19 of article III, which prohibited the audit or allowance
of claims against the state by the legislature; the legislature was permit-
ted only to appropriate money to pay claims which had been "audited
90 Id. at 724. The convention had filed its initial report and proposed amendments
on January 4, 1922.
1 Id. at 731-32.
92 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 23 (1925). The vote was 1,090,632 in favor, 711,018 against.
LEGISLATIVE M uAL 524.
The section said:
Nothing in this article contained shall abridge the authority of the legislature
to create or abolish any board or court with jurisdiction to hear and audit or
determine claims against the state, and any such tribunal existing when this arti-
de shall take effect shall be continued with the powers then vested in it until
otherwise provided by law.
N.Y. CONSr. art. VI, § 23 (1925). This section remained in the constitution until 1950 when
it was replaced with the current court of claims provision.
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and allowed according to law." The new provision made explicit that
the quoted language required actual adjudication of a claim to be by
a board, tribunal, or court of some kind.93
The state's next constitutional convention was held in 1938. In
the years since 1915 the legislature had suspended its practice of re-
current partisan abolishment and re-creation of claims tribunals. As a
result, the court of claims issue was far less controversial in 1938 than
it had been at the 1915 convention or the 1921 judicial convention."
The judiciary committee reported a provision making the court of
claims a constitutional court.9 5 The committee proposal was accepted
by the convention with very little discussion96 and without amend-
93 Of some interest is the relationship of section 10 of the Public Buildings Law to
article III, section 19 of the constitution. Under section 10 it is the General Services com-
missioner who audits and allows claims against the state. The General Services commis-
sioner is neither a tribunal nor a board. If he is not a court, article III, section 19 will
invalidate his section 10 authority. If he is or is not a court, article VI, section 9 will
invalidate his authority. See note 1 supra.
94 Also in the intervening years the jurisdiction of the statutory court of claims had
expanded. In 1929, the state waived its immunity for the torts of its agents. Act of April
10, 1929, ch. 467, [1929] N.Y. Laws 994. In a sense, the passage of this legislation was
forced by Governor Smith's veto in 1929 of 60 private bills concerning moral claims
against the state. The Governor's veto message stated:
There is no reason why access to the Court of Claims should be afforded only
to a selected few people who have friends to draw special bills for them and who
are able to obtain support in the Legislature to pass them. By disapproving these-
bills my chief purpose is to call attention to the need of the adoption of a new
policy in the hope that the next Legislature will give serious attention to this
matter and pass the necessary amendments to the General Laws so that this sub-
ject may be handled in the future in a logical, fair and orderly way, in place
of the haphazard, careless and discriminating procedure which has obtained up
to this time.
PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOVERNOR ALFRED E. Sr sr-1928, at 202 (1938).
95 JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUrIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1938,
app. 3, No. 8, at 4 (1938).
96 Charles B. Sears, chairman of the judiciary committee, explained the provision to
the convention as follows:
The committee came to the conclusion that it would best serve the interests of
the State to provide for the organization of the Court of Claims by constitutional
enactment. The language of this proposal is almost identical with the proposal
of the Convention of 1915. There was a time, of course, when the Court of Claims
*.. was made the football of politics; there has been nothing of that kind in re-
cent years, and yet there is a possibility of a recurrence of such a condition. The
proposal is a simple one, and the committee urges its adoption.
Ill REcoa--1938, at 2001.
Only one delegate, G. C. Lewis, commented on the proposal. He inquired of Sears the
meaning of the language conferring jurisdiction on the courts of claims over claims "be-
tween conflicting claimants." Id. at 2001-02. The language created a type of "pendent"
jurisdiction and Sears replied that it was intended to permit a "complete and final deter-
mination" of the controversy. Id. at 2002. The court of claims could not only determine
the amount of the award to be paid by state but, as between competing claimants, could
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ment9 7 The address of the convention to the people simply stated,
"The Court of Claims and the Municipal Court of the City of New
York are established as constitutional courts."98 The constitution
adopted by the convention was submitted to the people in the form
of nine separate propositions. The people ratified six and rejected
three. 9 The proposed judiciary article was among those defeated. 00
Provisions to create a constitutional court of claims had now been
rejected three times by the people, twice through defeat of the entire
constitution and once through defeat of a judiciary article. On No-
vember 8, 1949, a referendum on the proposal as a separate question
was presented to the people for the first time. The people voted to
establish a constitutional court of claims by vote of 1,479,971 to 616,
707.101 An "abstract" submitted to the people with the proposed amend-
ment recited:
The purpose and effect of this proposed amendment is to make
the Court of Claims a constitutional court and thereby deprive the
legislature of its present power to abolish that court at any time.
The court now hears and determines claims against the State pursu-
ant to legislative authority and direction. This amendment would
incorporate that statutory authority and direction into the con-
stitution.102
also determine how the award would be divided. This proposal had first been advanced
and rejected at the 1915 convention. III REcoRD-1915, at 2486.
97 For the text of the provision see IV REcoa>-1938, at 8431.
08 Id. at 3514..
99 LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 329-30.
Since 1874 New York constitutions had provided that the legislature should not grant
any extra compensation to contractors. N.Y. CONSr. art. IX, § 10 (1938); id. art. III, § 24
(1874). In 1963 the provision was eliminated entirely. Of course, article VII, section 8
prohibits the gift of state money to any private corporation or undertaking. Conceivably,
section 10 of the Public Buildings Law takes the peculiar form that it does because of
the draftsman's desire to avoid the gift problem. From this viewpoint, it was critical to
show some substantial consideration coming from the South Mall contractors in return
for the additional state money. This was done by making the General Services commis-
sioner's "equitable adjustment" constitute a release of the contractor's claims.
100 LEGISLAIW MANUAL 329.
101 Id. at 334.
102 Quoted in Easley v. New York State Thruway Auth., 1 N.Y.2d 874, 377, 135
NYE,.2d 572, 574, 153 N.Y.2d 28, 30 (1956). An "abstract" is prepared by the Secretary
of State pursuant to statutory authority. N.Y. ELEcrioN LAw § 68 (McKinney 1964). The
last sentence of the abstract raises an interesting question. The constitutional provision
itself says nothing about incorporating existing statutory authority into the constitution.
Article VI, section 9 provides:
The court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine claims against the state
or by the state against the claimant or between conflicting claimants as the legis-
lature may provide.
This language is different from that of the proposed 1915 and 1988 constitutions, both of
which provided:
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The amendment has been discussed by the Court of Appeals in
Easley v. New York State Thruway Authority.03 Easley concerned the
validity of a statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon the court
of claims to determine all claims against the Thruway Authority for
tort or breach of contract. Plaintiff's negligence action against the Au-
thority for personal injuries was dismissed by the supreme court on
the ground that, in view of the statute, the supreme court lacked juris-
diction over the subject matter. Plaintiff argued that the statute was
invalid since the constitution limited the jurisdiction of the court of
claims to "claims against the state."'104 The court upheld the statute,
The court shall have the jurisdiction now exercised by it and such additional
jurisdiction to hear and determine claims . .. as the legislature may provide.
DOCUMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEw YoRg, 1915, No.
52, at 32 (1915); JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
1938, app. 3, No. 15, at 79 (1938). Under the proposed 1915 and 1938 language it was clear
that the legislature could add to the court's jurisdiction but could not remove any juris-
diction "now exercised" by the court. If the last sentence of the 1949 abstract is accurate,
the change in language between the 1915 and 1938 proposals and the 1949 amendment
was not intended to be meaningful. The current situation would then be that the legis-
lature may expand, but not contract below 1949 levels, the court's jurisdiction. Some
support for this view is found in the Court of Appeals statement that the purpose of
the 1949 amendment was to remove "uncertainty" concerning the "power" of the court
of claims. Easley v. New York State Thruway Auth., 1 N.Y. 2d 374, 378, 135 N.E.2d 572,
574, 153 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 (1956). It would follow from this interpretation that the state
has constitutionally waived its sovereign immunity with respect to the court's 1949 juris-
diction.
A different interpretation is that the language change noted above is indeed mean-
ingful and that the legislature may therefore contract the court's jurisdiction. By this
view, the state's sovereign immunity has not been constitutionally waived. Necessarily,
according to this approach, the last sentence of the abstract is wrong; no statutory au-
thority has been incorporated into the constitution. The abstract would then amount to
a deceit practiced upon the people. To avoid this unique and disturbing problem, the
courts may well adopt the former view despite its textual weakness.
A new judiciary article, including the court of claims provision, was adopted by the
people on November 7, 1961, to take effect on September 1, 1962. LEGISLATIVE MANUAL
341. It may be that this later date, rather than 1949, is the relevant one for determining
what statutory authority, if any, has been incorporated.
103 1 N.Y.2d 874, 185 N.E.2d 572, 153 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1956).
104 In Easley the constitutional issue was properly before the court. Under existing
New York law, a mere taxpayer has no standing to attack the constitutionality of state
legislation. St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192 N.E.2d 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d
43 (1963). "[Tjhe constitutionality of a State statute may be tested only by one personally
aggrieved thereby .... "Id. at 76, 192 N.E.2d at 15-16, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 44. Only New York and
New Mexico clearly prohibit taxpayer actions. Id. at 78, 192 N.E.2d at 17, 242 N.Y.S.2d
at 46 (dissenting opinion). The expressed rationale is that to permit taxpayers suits "would
be an interference by one department of government with another." Id. at 76, 192 N.E.2d
at 16, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 45. Judge Fuld disagreed with the St. Clair majority, noting that it
was fundamental in our form of government "that determination of the constitutionality
of legislation is essentially a judicial function." Id. at 80, 192 N.E.2d at 18, 242 N.Y.S.2d
at 48. Judge Fuld observed, "It is self-evident that the denial of standing to a taxpayer
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reasoning that the court of claims's constitutional jurisdiction was not
limited to actions "brought directly against the State" 105 and that it
"cannot be doubted that this Authority is an arm or agency of the
State."10 6 The court reviewed the constitutional history of the 1949
provision, observing that
[i]ts purpose was to remove the Court of Claims from political
control and uncertainty of existence and power. It did this by mak-
ing the Court of Claims a constitutional court and by providing in
the Constitution that the court should always have jurisdiction of
suits against the State.107
will in most instances prevent any challenge to an expenditure of state funds as violative
of the Constitution." Id. at 79, 192 NX..2d at 18, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 47. cf. Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968), in which Mr. Justice Douglas wrote that the judiciary "is often the
one and only place where effective relief can be obtained.... [lit is abdication for courts
to close their doors." Id. at 111 (concurring opinion).
The New York constitution is not self-executing. If the comptroller refuses payment
pursuant to a questionable statute, the validity of the statute is likely to be tested in the
courts. The contractor would be obliged to sue the comptroller and the comptroller
would assert the defense of unconstitutionality. The St. Clair approach, however, places
the comptroller in a difficult and unfair position, since if he fails to stop payment his
non-action effectively establishes the statute as constitutional in the sense of preventing
all constitutional challenges to the law. The comptroller is thus forced to play a last-
chance role. He would seem justified in refusing payment in any case in which a sub-
stantial constitutional question is brought to his attention. This is plainly an imposition
upon the comptroller, but is required by the St. Clair rationale.
Although St. Clair grants the state immunity, taxpayer actions may be freely brought
against local officials. N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAw § 51 (McKinney 1965). This provision is
traceable to an 1872 law (Act of April 2, 1872, ch. 161, [1872] N.Y. Laws 467) which
was intended to provide a remedy for municipal taxpayers against the practice of local
officials fraudulently issuing town bonds for the benefit of private railroads. See Ayers v.
Lawrence, 59 N.Y. 192 (1874). The current section 51 provides that "an action may be
maintained against" an officer of a county or other locality "to prevent any illegal official
act." N.Y. GEN. MuNIc. LAW § 51 (McKinney 1965). Since $850 million or possibly one
billion dollars of Albany County bonds are to be issued in connection with the Mall, it
would seem that the validity of the South Mall scheme could be tested by an action
brought against the appropriate Albany County official.
105 1 N.Y.2d at 378, 135 NXE.2d at 574, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
'106 Id. at 876, 185 N.E.2d at 578, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
107 Id. at 878, 135 N.E.2d at 574, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 30-31. In dissent Judge Van Voorhis
took the position that the Authority was not an arm or agency of the state. He believed
it to be an independent corporate entity whose separate identity must be maintained. Of
the jurisdiction of the court, he wrote that it "is to hear and determine claims against the
State or by the State against the claimant or between conflicting claimants 'as the legis-
lature may provide': that is to say, where the Legislature has waived immunity." Id. at
883, 185 N.E.2d at 577, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85.
Subsequent to the establishment of the court as a constitutional court, several un-
successful efforts were made to merge its jurisdiction into that of the supreme court.
TEMPoRARY STATE COInMr'N ON THE COURTS 1958, 1958 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 36, at 9; id., 1957
N.Y. LEo. Doc. No. 88, at 94; id., 1957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 6, at 10.
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II
PUBLIC BUILDINGS LAW SECTION 10
AND THE COURT OF CLAIMS
The draftsmanship of section 10 of the Public Buildings Law dem-
onstrates a conscious effort to parallel the jurisdiction"8 of the court
of claims. The critical language of the statute provides as follows:
In any contract heretofore or hereafter awarded by the com-
missioner of general services for the construction, reconstruction,
alteration, repair, or improvement of any public building or facility
in the Albany South Mall project where the commissioner has
determined that the performance of all or any part of the work
has been suspended, delayed, or interrupted for an extraordinary
and unreasonable period of time by an act or omission of the state
not expressly or impliedly authorized by the contract, an equitable
adjustment may be made for any increase in the cost of perfor-
mance of the contract directly caused thereby.... Upon the agree-
ment of the parties the contract may be modified in writing
accordingly, and any cause of action for damages which otherwise
might have accrued because of such act or omission shall be ex-
tinguished. Any agreement so modifying the contract shall state
the terms of the agreement, the amount of the adjustment and the
basis therefor. Every such agreement shall be subject to the approval
of the state comptroller, the presiding judge of the court of claims
and, as to the form and manner of execution, the state attorney
general....109
108 The Court of Appeals has defined jurisdiction as "the power to hear and deter-
mine." Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N.Y. 520, 530, 106 N.E. 675, 667-78 (1914).
109 N.Y. PuB. BLmcs. LAw § 10 (McKinney Supp. 1970). Provision is also made for
adjustment agreements to be made public. Id. See note 113 infra.
The General Services commissioner largely controls the design, construction, and main-
tenance of state buildings. N.Y. Pu. BLDGS. LAW § 3 (McKinney Supp. 1970). He is the
primary state agent in the award of state construction contracts, although the award proce-
dure permits him little discretion. Id. § 8. Under section 18, the commissioner may make
"addition[s] in price" respecting state contracts. Rather than the adjudicatory determination
authorized in section 10, however, this section seems to contemplate minor contract re-
negotiations. That the legislature enacted section 10 when section 18 was already in exis-
tence constitutes some evidence that it was consciously expanding the commissioner's power
with respect to one category of construction contracts.
Section 10 also provides:
No adjustment shall be made to the extent that performance would have been
so affected by any other cause, including, among others, the fault or negligence
of the contractor and any other factor of difficulty, expense, delay, damage, or
risk of loss within the legal responsibility of the contractor. No adjustment shall
be granted in an amount which, together with any other sum obligated under
the contract, shall exceed the money appropriated or otherwise lawfully avail-
able for the project.
N.Y. Pun. BLrs. LAW § 10 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
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Several parallels between section 10's authorization and that of the
court of claims may be noted.
Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the court of claims is to "hear
and determine claims against the state."'1 0 The jurisdiction of the Gen-
eral Services commissioner is to make a "determination" of the state's
responsibility for delay of the South Mall project.I"
Claims. The Court of Claims Act provides that a "claim shall state
the time when and place where such claim arose, the nature of same,
and the items of damage or injuries claimed to have- been sustained
and the total sum claimed." 112 Section 10 provides:
Any contractor so aggrieved may make application in writing for
such a determination and adjustment. Any application by a con-
tractor for an equitable adjustment shall recite the grounds upon
which relief is claimed, including the nature and circumstances
thereof, and the items of damage alleged to have been sustained." 3
Substantive Elements. Under the Court of Claims Act, state lia-
bility for breach of contract 1 4 based on delay requires a determination
(1) that the work has been delayed for an extraordinary or unreason-
able period of time, 15 (2) that the delay was caused by state action" 6
or failure to coordinate," 7 and (3) that the delay is not authorized by
the contract." 8 Section 10 provides that the General Services com-
missioner shall determine if "[1] the work has been suspended, delayed,
or interrupted for an extraordinary and unreasonable period of time
[2] by an act or omission of the state [3] not expressly or impliedly au-
thorized by the contract .... ",11
The Court of Claims Act requires that the state's legal liability
be proved. It provides that no "judgment shall be granted on any
110 N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 9; N.Y. Cr. CL. Acr § 9(2) (McKinney 1963).
1 N.Y. PuB. BLDGS. LAW § 10 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
112 N.Y. Or. CL. Acr § 11 (McKinney 1963).
113 N.Y. PuB. BLDGS. LAW § 10 (McKinney Supp. 1970). In the code language of sec-
tion 10, "application" equals claim and "adjustment" or "equitable adjustment" equals
judgment.
114 N.Y. Cr. CL. Aar § 9(2) (McKinney 1963).
115 Forest Elec. Corp. v. State, 30 App. Div. 2d 905, 292 N.Y.S2d 589 (3d Dep't 1968).
The court noted that "[a]ctionable delay must be more than 'ordinary' delay." Id. at 906,
292 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
11 Wright & Kremers v. State, 263 N.Y. 615, 189 N.E. 724 (1934): Tohnson, Drake &
Piper, Inc. v. State, 29 App. Div. 2d 793, 287 N.Y.S.2d 480 (3d Dep't 1968).
117 Forest Elec. Corp. v. State, 30 App. Div. 2d 905, 292 N.Y.S.2d 589 (3d Dep't 1968);
Websco Const. Corp. v. State, 57 Misc. 2d 9, 292 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
118 The terms of the standard state contract provide that ordinary delays "shall be
compensated for by an extension of time." See Forest Elec. Corp. v. State, 30 App. Div. 2d
905, 906, 292 N.Y.2d 589, 590 (3d Dep't 1968).
119 N.Y. PUB. BLuG. LAw § 10 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
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claim against the state except upon such legal evidence as would estab-
lish liability against an individual or corporation in a court of law or
equity."120 Section 10 also authorizes the General Services commis-
sioner to determine the legal sufficiency of a contractor's allegation of
state liability:
No adjustment shall be made to the extent that performance would
have been so affected by any other cause, including, among others,
the fault or negligence of the contractor and any other factor of
difficulty, expense, delay, damage, or risk of loss within the legal
responsibility of the contractor.121
The section, however, does not require presentation of "legal evi-
dence."
Relief. The Court of Claims Act provides that the "determination
of the court upon a claim shall be by a judgment.'- 2 2 The court may
award damages for additional cost directly caused by the state's wrong-
ful delay.123 Section 10 provides that the General Services commis-
sioner may, if he finds the state liable, make an "equitable adjustment"
of the contract. The "equitable adjustment" shall be made for "any
increase in the cost of performance of the contract directly caused [by
the state's delay]."'1 24
Res Judicata. A judgment of the court of claims is, of course, res
judicata. The Court of Claims Act provides that a judgment "shall
forever bar any further claim or demand against the state arising out
of the matters involved in the controversy."'1 25 Section 10 provides for
a consensual res judicata. If the contractor accepts the equitably ad-
justed contract, "any cause of action for damages which otherwise might
have accrued because of such act or omission shall be extinguished."'126
Despite these parallels, however, the two provisions differ in sev-
eral significant ways. In the court of claims the state is represented by
the attorney general. Before the General Services commissioner the
state is not represented. Any judgment of the court of claims may be
120 N.Y. Cr. CL. ACr § 12(1) (McKinney 1963).
121 N.Y. PUB. BLDGS. LAw § 10 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
122 N.Y. Cr. CL. Acr § 20(1) (McKinney 1963).
123 See, e.g., Seglin-Harrison Const. Co. v. State, 80 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Ct. CI. 1941), aff'd
as modified, 264 App. Div. 466, 35 N.Y.S.2d 940 (3d Dep't 1942).
124 N.Y. Pu. BLDGS. LAW § 10 (McKinney Supp. 1970)., The statute apparently con-
templates an award for prospective damages, i.e., those not yet incurred. No court of claims
case permitting such damages has been found. The absence of such a case is related to
the jurisdictional question discussed at note 16 and accompanying text supra.
125 N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 20(4) (McKinney 1963). See Chaffee v. Lawrence, 282 App. Div.
875, 124 N.Y.S.2d 425 (2d Dep't 1953).
126 N.Y. Put. BLmGs. LAW § 10 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
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appealed by the attorney general. 127 There is no appeal by the state
from the General Services commissioner's "equitable adjustment."'128
Under section 10, the role of the attorney general is extremely
limited. He is to approve the new equitably adjusted contract only as
to "form and manner of execution.'1 29 Section 10 also calls for approval
by the comptroller and the presiding judge of the court of claims. 30
These gentlemen are faced with an unenviable task since there is es-
sentially no record to review. The only existing documents would
seem to be (1) the original contract, (2) the contractor's "application"
for an adjustment, and (3) the new equitably adjusted contract. There
is no record of a hearing nor, indeed, any requirement that a hearing
be held. There is no presentation of the state's case since the attorney
general has been excluded. Further, section 10 gives no indication of
what standards are to be applied in granting or withholding approval.
In summary, section 10 parallels the jurisdiction and practice of
the court of claims except for tertain provisions favorable to con-
tractors. Particularly may be noted (1) the absence of the attorney
general to present the the state's case; (2) the absence of the require-
ment that any determination be based on "legal evidence"; (3) the ap-
parent contemplation of prospective damages; and (4) the concept of
consensual res judicata. There is no explanation why such provisions
should be restricted to the South Mall contractors.
CONCLUSION-SECTION 10 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Established by constitution, the court of claims plainly cannot
have its jurisdiction transferred, in whole or in part, to the General
Services commissioner. Yet it appears equally clear that this is the in-
tent and effect of section 10. To avoid this conclusion, one would
have to maintain that either (1) section 10 does not provide for the
determination of a claim against the state or (2) the jurisdiction of the
court of claims is not exclusive.
The first contention is patently absurd. Section 10 obviously pro-
127 N.Y. Cr. CL. Acr § 24 (McKinney 1963). Appeal is generally taken to the appellate
division, third department. Id.
128 N.Y. PUB. BLDGS. LAW § 10 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
129 Id.
180 The provision for the presiding judge of the court of claims as an approving party
is of interest. It may reflect the draftsman's belief that the presiding judge would bring
his constitutional jurisdiction to the act of approving the agreement. But constitutional
jurisdiction is not like the shell of a turtle; it does not move around with its owner.
Constitutional powers are not personal; they must be exercised in conformity with the
constitution and the Court of Claims Act.
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vides a statutory pattern which provides for the determination of a
legal claim against the state.131
The second argument is also erroneous. The only point of the
movement to establish a constitutional court of claims was to restrain
legislative power over the forum in which claims against the state were
determined. To prevent the recurrence of legislative abuse, the court
of claims was established as a constitutional court with exclusive juris-
diction.
By transferring part of the jurisdiction of the court of claims to
the General Services commissioner, the New York legislature has ex-
ercised a prerogative that it no longer had, and one that had been
taken away after nearly a hundred years of efforts at constitutional
reform. As the history traced in this article clearly shows, the intent
of the constitutional reformers was to prevent such legislative transfers
of jurisdiction over claims against the state. Section 10, therefore, must
be regarded as unconstitutional. 132
131 See text accompanying notes 108-30 supra.
132 No further payments should be made pursuant to an unconstitutional scheme.
As to payments which have already been made, the Court of Appeals has recently dem-
onstrated a substantial flexibility in order to avoid forfeiture to a private contractor.
Gerzof v. Sweeney, 22 N.Y.2d 297, 239 N.E.2d 521, 292 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1968).
